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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS IN THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
In recent years, the trend toward greater mobility, especially in changing jobs,
has created a perplexing problem for the American businessman. To survive com-
petitively in our increasingly complex economy, it is almost essential for each busi-
ness to develop its own "bag of tricks" which gives it a competitive advantage. To
protect this "bag of tricks" the businessman usually must rely either on the patent
law, or the law of trade secrets. The former when the "bag of tricks" includes
something which is patentable;' the latter when the businessman does not wish to
secure a patent or when a patent is unobtainable.
2
When the law of trade secrets is thus utilized by an employer, he faces the
possible loss of his trade secrets each time a trusted employee who either has helped
develop, or has dealt with the employer's trade secrets in the regular course of
business, terminates his employment. Thus, the employer is confronted with the
possibility of an employee's disclosing these trade secrets to a competitor, with whom
he may seek future employment, or his using them to compete with his former em-
ployer; such possibility presents the employer with a serious threat of loss of his
competitive advantage.
I. Definition of a Trade Secret
Once a former employer seeks judicial recognition and protection of his alleged
trade secret his foremost obstacle is establishing that he possesses a juridically
protectable trade secret. For most purposes it may be stated that:
A trade secret may consist of any formula or pattern, any machine or
process of manufacturing or of any device or compilation of information
which is used in one's business and which may give to the user an oppor-
tunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do know or use it.3
As the term "trade secret" indicates, matters of public knowledge or general
knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated as a trade secret.4 Any idea,
information or process, however, which is not obvious, has value and would require
some substantial expenditures of time, work, or money by another to arrive at
the same result independently can be considered a trade secret;s the expenditure
1 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1958) makes "[A]ny new and useful process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof," patentable.
2 While a patent has a limited duration (17 years), a trade secret may have indefinite
existence, depending on the business's ability to keep it confidential.
3 Mycalex Corp. of America v. Pemco Corp., 64 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Md. 1946). See
also, Boost Co. v. Faunce, 13 N.J. Super. 63, 80 A.2d 246 (1951); Sandlin v. Johnson, 141
F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1944). For a more detailed definition of a trade secret, see RESTATEM-ENT,
TORTS, Explanatory Note § 757, comment b at 5 (1939):
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compila-
tion of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or
use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manu-
facturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other
device, or a list of customers. It differs from the secret information in a busi-
ness . . . in that it is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events
in the conduct of the business, as, for example, the amount or other terms of
a secret bid for a contract or the salary of certain employees, or the security
investments made or contemplated, or the date fixed for the announcement
of a new policy or for bringing out a new model or the like. A trade secret
is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business.
Generally it relates to the production of goods, as, for example, a machine or
formula for the production of an article. It may, however, relate to the sale
of goods or to other operations in the business, such as a code for determin-
ing discounts, rebates or other concessions in a price list or catalogue or a list
of specialized customers, or a method of bookkeeping or other office man-
agement.
4 Aetna Building Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. App. 2d 198, 246 P.2d 11, 16 (1952).
5 Schreyen v. Casco Products Corp., 97 F. Supp. 159, 168 (D. Conn.), aff'd 190 F.2d
921 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 913 (1952); Vitro Corporation of America v. Hall
Chemical Co., 254 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1958).
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of time, effort or money rather than the brilliance of conception or execution is the
key factor.4 Once such expenditure produces a result which, if used, continuously
in the operation of business, would give the possessor an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it, that result may be con-
sidered a trade secret.7
The application o this definition to particular cases is illustrated by these
factors which the courts have considered in determining whether or not a trade
secret exists: the extent to which the information is known outside the business;
the extent to which it is known by employees or others involved in the business; the
extent of measures taken to guard the secrecy of the information; the value of the
information to the owner and to his competitors; the amount of effort or money
expended in developing the information; and the ease or difficulty with which the
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by another.5 And through
this application the following have been recognized as trade secrets: new methods
of combining known ingredients, 9 formulas,10 bookkeeping methods," chemicals,
12
patterns,1a customer lists,' 4 blueprints,' 5 machinery, 16 raw material sources 7 secret
pricing codes,' 8 processes' 9 and ingredients.2 0
Although the definition seems explicit and the factors enumerated above seem
inclusive, there is still no uniformity in determining whether or not a trade secret
exists in a particular case; this indicates that the enumerated factors do not exhaust
all possible considerations. What courts actually do in these cases is to consider
not only the interest of the employer, but also the relative interest of the individual
employee and of the public as a whole in what might be called a "balancing of
the interests approach" to trade secret cases.
This balancing of the interest approach is explained in Ellis, Trade Secrets:"
Cases involving right of employees to leave and compete are examples of
balancing interests or equities.... The court is faced with two conflicting
policies. On the one hand, we have the desire to encourage competition and
to facilitate the exercise by an individual of all his skill and knowledge and
on the other hand there is the wish to give reasonable protection against un-
fair competition to established business.
The doctrine .of balancing the interests or equities is well known to
equity in other situations. It is conceded that when the problem is ap-
proached on these considerations precise mathematical certainty is unattain-
6 ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS 240 (1953).
7 von Kalinowski, Key Employees and Trade Secrets, 47 VA. L. Rv. 583, 587 (1961);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Explanatory Note § 757, comment b at 5 (1939). Compare, Harris
Manufacturing Co. v. Williams, 757 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Ark. 1957), which holds that trade
secret protection is obtainable although the plaintiff is not currently using the process sought to
be protected.
8 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Explanatory Note § 757, comment b at 6 (1939).
9 Allen Manufacturing'Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn. 509, 144 A.2d 306 (1958).
10 Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86 Atl. 688 (1913).
11 Gates-McDonald Co. v. McQuilkin, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 481, 34 N.E.2d 443 (Ct. App.
1941).
12 Heyden Chemical Corp. v. Burrell & Neidig Inc., 2 N.J. Super. 467, 64 A.2d 465
(1949).
13 Kanumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485 (1923).
14 Town & Country House & Homes Service v. Newbery, 3 N.Y.2d 554, 147 N.E.2d 724(1958).
15 Pressed Steel 'Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 Atl. 4 (1904).
16 A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cir 1934), modified
74 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1935).
17 Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Assmann, 185 App. Div. 399, 73 N.Y. Supp. 334 (Sup. Ct.
1918).
18 Simmons Hardware Co. v. Waibel, 1 S.D. 488, 47 N.W. 814 (1891).
19 Allen-Qualley Co. v. Shellmar Products Co., 31 F.2d 293 (N.D. Ill. 1929), aff'd 36
F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1930).
20 Belmont Laboratories v. Heist, 300 Pa. 542, 151 Atl. 15 (1930), modified 303 Pa. 7,
154 Atl. 19 (1931).
21 ELLIS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 18.
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able in setting the limits of the protection afforded, but this approach does
seem more practical and to be more in keeping with the reality of what the
courts are doing beneath such surface terms as "property, .... secrets," "im-
plied contract," and so on.
Through the application of this balancing the interests approach, the courts
have drawn a fine line of demarcation between ideas and information in the mind of
the employee which constitute protectable trade secrets of the former employer and
an employee's aptitude, his dexterity, his manual and mental ability, and such
other subjective knowledge as he obtains which he has the right to use and expand
in a competitor's employment. This line becomes increasingly more obscure as the
employee's work is more closely identified with basic research.2 2 The closer the
scientific and technical information, claimed to be a trade secret, approaches "pure
science," the easier it is for a court to equate it with the basic mental equipment
of the particular employee and thus, not a trade secret.
One factor which is often outcome determinative in a borderline situation
where the court, it seems, may go either way as to the existence of a protectable
trade secret is the degree to which the employee has violated business ethics and
morals. Judicial emphasis23 of this factor in determining whether or not a protectable
trade secret exists seems to point out the fact that the courts are weighing the interest
of the public in fair competition. And the tendency of these cases to give protection
to questionable trade secrets where the employee's conduct is deemed grossly un-
ethical by the courts, tends to show that the courts are implementing a general policy
of imposing standards of ethics and morals on the business community. Two cases 4
involving Adolph Gottscho Inc. exemplify the effect ethical considerations have
on the determination of whether or not a trade secret exists in a particular case.
Both cases involved Adolph Gottscho Inc. as plaintiff suing its former employees
and their new employers to protect his alleged trade secrets; both cases concerned
essentially much of the same information. Yet, information held to be trade secrets
in the earlier case, was refused that status in the later case. The only reason the
second court gave for its opposite finding was the differences in the moral conduct
of the employees involved in each case. The court stated: 25
[Tihe relief granted was based on the inequitable conduct of one
Jackson, who was in confidential relationship to the plaintiff and left to join
American Marking Corporation, taking to his new employment all the
knowledge and skill he had acquired while working for the plaintiff (quot-
ing the earlier case). "His conduct was grossly improper and gave rise to
the plaintiff's cause of action based on long settled equitable principles and
supported by marked changes in the attitude of the law towards the need for
commercial morality."
The court concluded that the conduct of the employees involved in the later case
was not as morally objectionable as Jackson's earlier conduct; it then found that
no trade secrets existed in the later case.
22 von Kalinowski, supra note 7, at 589, alludes to this problem and predicts future diffi-
culty with it in the courts.
23 Recent cases emphasizing unethical conduct on the part of an employee in finding pro-
tectable trade secrets include: C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 183
A.2d 374 (1962); New England Overall Co. v. Woltman, 343 Mass. 108, 176 N.E.2d 193
(1961); Hyde Corporation v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763 (1958); Adolph
Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 35 N.J. Super. 333, 114 A.2d 19 (1954); Franke
v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953); and in Reid v. Mass Co., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 2d
328, 318 P.2d 54 (1957) the court in setting out requirements for recovery in a customer list
case included solicitation of the former employer's customers with intent to injure.
Recent cases emphasizing the lack of unethical conduct on the part of the employee in
finding that no trade secret existed include: Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. Bell-Mark Corp., 79 N.J.
Super. 156, 191 A.2d 67 (1963); Spring Steels, Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 162 A.2d 370
(1960).
24 Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., supra; and Adolph Gottscho, Inc.
v. Bell-Mark Corp., supra.
25 79 N.J. Super. 156, 191 A.2d 67, 70 (1963).
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II. Employer Actions
The typical trade secret case stemming from an employer-employee relation-
ship involves three parties: the employer, the employee and a competitor of the
employer. The employee gains knowledge of the employer's trade secrets through
his employment. Then the employee either approaches or is approached by a
competitor of the employer concerning possible employment with the competitor;
the thought being that the disclosure and use of the employer's trade secrets will
mutually benefit the employee and the competitor - the employee receives an
increased salary and the competitor obtains the beneficial use of the former em-
ployer's trade secrets. The employer will usually sue both the employee and the
competitor in such a situation. He seeks to enjoin the employee's disclosure and
use of the alleged trade secret and he also seeks to enjoin the competitor's
elicitation of such disclosure; the former employer also may seek to recover either
damages, or unjust profits for the improper utilization of his trade secrets, while
concurrently seeking an injunction against any future use of disclosure, in a case
where improper disclosure is consummated and improper utilization has begun.
Thus, the usual relief sought is the injunction against wrongful disclosure or use,
or a similar injunction coupled with either damages or an accounting for profits.
However the facts of a particular case may warrant other relief such as an order
for the return of plans or copies of the secret; 8 the destruction of instruments
embodying the trade secret; 27 and the assignment of patents wrongfully acquired.
28
Basis for Relief Against the Former Employee-Non-Contractual
All through the development of the law of trade secrets, courts have used
various legal bases for granting relief for the protection of trade secrets. The more
important of these grounds have been: breach of confidence, property right, implied
contract, and contract.29 However, the recent judicial attitude bespeaks an almost
complete reliance on breach of confidence as the grounds for decision. Such attitude
is exemplified in E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland ° in which the
court states:
The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an
unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact
that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether
the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the facts,
whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The
property may be denied but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the
starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law,
but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or
one of them. These have given place to hostility, and the first thing to be
made sure of is that the defendant shall not fraudulently abuse the trust
reposed in him. It is the usual incident of confidential relations. If there is
any disadvantage in the fact that he knew the plaintiff's secrets he must take
the burden with the good.
Often it is stated that the employee's duty of nondisclosure of his former
employer's trade secrets, which he acquired knowledge of through his employment,
arises from an implied term of the employment contract.3' However, it seems im-
material whether this duty is found to arise from an implied contract or from an
employer-employee relationship of trust and confidence, similar to a fiduciary rela-
tionship. Generally, courts will rely on the employer-employee relationship in finding
26 Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 At. 4 (1904).
27 American Bell Tel. Co. v. Kitsell, 35 Fed. 521 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888).
28 Allen-Qualley Co. v. Waibel, 31 F.2d 293 (N.D. Ill. 1929).
29 Extrin Foods, Inc. v. Leighton, 202 Misc. 592, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sup. Ct. 1952)
(breach of confidence); Glass v. Kottwitz, 297 S.W. 573 (Civ. App. Texas 1927) (property
right); 0. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 114 Mich. 149, 72 N.W. 140 (1897) (implied con-
tract); Fralich v. Despar, 165 Pa. 24, 30 At. 521 (1894) (contract).
30 E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
31 H. B. Wiggins Sons Co. v. Cott-A-Lapp Co., 169 Fed. 150 (C.C.D. Conn. 1909);
Taylro Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 73 N.J. Eq. 684, 69 Aut. 186 (Ct. Err. & App. 1908).
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this duty of nondisclosure;3 2 then, they will determine whether or not relief should
be given by looking at other factors, especially by determining whether or not a
trade secret is involved in the particular case. Since the choice of grounds for
granting relief is immaterial, it is submitted that the superior rationale would be
the breach of the confidential relationship between the employee and ,former em-
ployer rather than either the breach of an implied contract, or the conversion of
a property right; this is due to the tendency of the courts to expand the definition
of a trade secret where the factor of grossly unethical conduct on the part of the
employee is present. This would seem to be more in accord with a breach of con-
fidence than either implied contract or property right.
Basis for Relief Against the Former Employee - Contractual
Ofttimes, trade secret protection apparently need not be predicated on the
finding of a breach of confidence for there exists a written contract of employment
in which the employee either covenanted not to disclose or use the employer's
trade secrets after the termination of his employment, or covenanted not to compete
with the employer after termination of his employment. However, the existence of
a covenant not to disclose or use the employer's trade secrets, standing alone,
usually does not render a result different from that reached when no such contract
exists. The general rule is that such a covenant will be held valid only if it goes no
farther than is necessary to protect the trade secrets involved.3  The point at which
such a covenant becomes excessively restrictive, so as to become invalid as a
restraint of trade, depends on the degree of restriction balanced against the value of
the secret information. 4 If the covenant purporting to protect trade secrets is made
so broad in its language as to cover also other knowledge of the business in addition
to the trade secrets which the employee has learned from his employment with the
employer, it may then be held invalid. 5 Similarly a covenant not to disclose or
use trade secrets may fail because what the employer deemed to be a trade secret
proves in fact not to be such; 6 the courts seemingly look to the existence of a
confidential relationship as a prerequisite for finding protectable business informa-
tion which is classified as a trade secret. Thus, the courts revert to the balancing of
interests approach even in a situation in which the employee expressly contracted
not to disclose or use the employer's secrets.
In a sense, a covenant not to compete is merely an indirect form of a covenant
not to disclose or use trade secrets; an employee who cannot compete, directly or
indirectly with his former employer does not have the opportunity to disclose or
use the employer's trade secrets. Realizing this, it is not surprising that the approach
of courts, when considering the enforceability of covenants not to compete is very
similar to their balancing of the interests approach to the law of trade secrets.
The courts will look at the scope of the restraint to see if it is greater than necessary
to protect the legitimate interests of the employer, the harshness of the results of
the restraint on the employee and the effect of the restraint on the public welfare,
32 Marcuse, The Protection of Trade Secrets: Theory and Practice, 36 CONN. B. J. 348,
354 (1962), states that, "In these cases the confidentiality of the relationship can virtually be
taken for granted. No case has been discovered in which a trade secret learned in the course of
an employer-employee relationship did not involve the requisite degree of confidentiality."
33 Larx Co. v. Nicol, 224 Minn. 1, 28 N.W.2d 705 (1946); Harrison v. Glucose Sugar
Refining Co., 116 Fed. 304 (7th Cir. 1902); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 516 (a), (f)
(1932).
34 Limitations upon former employees that cut into their means of livelihood will be looked
upon with great suspicion. National Starch Products, Inc. v. Polymer Industries, Inc., 273 App.
Div. 732, 79 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1948).
35 Taylro Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 70 N.J. Eq. 541, 69 Atl. 186 (Ct. Err. & App. 1908).
See also, Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. Bell-Mark Corp., 79 N.J. Super. 156, 191 A.2d 67 (1963).
36 Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff, 299 Ill. 532, 132 N.E. 806 (1921). See Conmar Prod-
ucts Corp. v. Tibony, 63 F. Supp. 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1945) for the proposition that if the
employer does not keep information secret, then the employee need not, no matter what the
contract says.
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to determine if it is reasonable and then, enforceable." However, when such cov-
enants are found to be enforceable they form a basis for possible relief which is
substantially different than the relief given when other trade secrets protection are
involved. Where a covenant not to compete is enforced the employee may be
prevented from working for a competitor of the employer, while the usual relief
in the absence of such a covenant merely prevents an employee from disclosing
the employer's trade secrets or using them in competition with the employer.
This limitation on the injunctive relief, in the absence of a covenant not to compete,
involves a judicial effort to compromise the right of the employer for trade secret
protection with the right of the employee to utilize his full capabilities to earn a
living and provide for his family. Because of the severity of restricting the scope of
a man's employment opportunities so drastically, courts should closely scrutinize
such covenants not to compete when considering their enforceability. Such an ap-
proach is generally taken; the courts will not enforce a covenant not to compete
unless the restraint appears reasonable under the circumstances.3 8 Such covenants
are usually considered unreasonable and thus, unenforceable unless the covenant
is limited in scope to, at least, a geographical area3 9 and, in many cases, to both a
geographical area and a period of time.40 In many cases, even when the scope of
the covenant not to compete is no greater than is necessary to protect the employer's
interests, it may still operate so harshly upon the employee that the courts cannot
conscientiously term it reasonable.4
Even though a covenant, either one prohibiting disclosure or one prohibiting
competition is avoided as unduly restrictive, courts, in a trade secret case, will
often apply the breach of confidence basis for relief to work out an equitable result.
42
While in other cases, rather than holding such a covenant designed to prevent dis-
closure and use of trade secrets invalid as being too broad and thus too restrictive
there has been a trend in recent cases to judicially mold the covenant in such a
way that enforcing it as molded will give a result closer to that which would have
been given without the covenant.43 The State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. court44 states the process as follows:
(The lower court) cut the contractual cloth to the special equitable pattern
of the trade secret, thus following the rule that construction of a non-
competitive covenant to render it lawful is preferable to an interpretation
causing the opposite result.
Thus what the courts seem to be doing in this area of covenants intended to
prevent employees from disclosing or using the employer's trade secrets, is to
formulate the result which they would have given without such a covenant by
balancing all the interests involved; to compare this result with that which the
37 Arthur Murray Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio C.P. 1952) for a good example
of this three-point approach.
38 See 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1392-95 (1962); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 513-16
(1932).
39 The trend seems to be that a restraint no more extensive than the area in which the
employer does business, or may reasonably anticipate doing business, is reasonable. DeLong
Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), upheld a nationwide restraint; and
Thoms v. Sutherland, 52 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1931), upheld a world-wide restraint.
40 Nesko Corp. v. Fontaine, 19 Conn. Supp. 160, 110 A.2d 631 (1954). The court in
DeLong Corp. v. Lucas, supra, opined in dictum that a period of relatively short duration
stated in the covenant may operate affirmatively to offset harsher aspects of the restraint.
41 Arthur Murray v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio C.P. 1952) (in which the covenant
would have forced the employee to give up the work he is best-trained for); Standard Oil Co.
v. Bertelsen, 186 Minn. 483, 243 N.W. 701 (1932) (in which the employee would be forced to
move from his long-standing home).
42 Carpenter & Hughes v. De Joseph, 27 Misc. 2d 1003, 213 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct.
1960); McCombs v. McClelland, 223 Or. 475, 354 P.2d 311 (1960); Audiographic of New
York Corp. v. Thermionic Corp. of America, 198 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
43 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Dempster, 174 Cal. App. 2d 418, 344
P.2d 821 (1959); Schmidl v. Central Laundry & Supply Co., 13 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
44 Supra, 344 P.2d at 826.
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covenant would give; and then to uphold, mold, or void the covenant according to
the degree of similarity of the results.
Basis of Relief Against the Competitor Hiring the Former Employee
As stated above, in the typical trade secret case, relief is sought against both
the former employee and the competitor who has or is about to hire the employee.
This is a matter of economic necessity when damages are sought by the employer,
as the competitor is more likely to be financially able to satisfy a money judgment
than an employee. Similarly, where restitution of profits is sought, the competitor
may be the only party to have been substantially benefited from the wrongful use
of the trade secret. And when injunctive relief is sought by the employer, complete
protection of the trade secret is impossible, if a competitor, who has already received
knowledge of the trade secret from the employee, is not prevented from disclosing or
using it.
However, as the competitor in this situation is usually not in a fiduciary or
contractual relation with the employer, some ground other than the one upon which
relief against the employee is predicated, must be found to warrant relief from the
competitor. The governing principle is that the competitor is at liberty to discover
a trade secret by any fair and honest method and, once so found, to use it in the
same manner as the original discoverer.45 However, when a trade secret is acquired
from an employee by inducing him to breach his fiduciary or contractual obliga-
tions,48 or with notice that the trade secret was revealed by the employee in breach
of his obligations,47 relief may be granted against him on the basis of wrongful
acquisition or inequitable retention of such information. Even when the competitor
has gained knowledge of the trade secret without notice that it was revealed by the
employee in breach of such trust, it would seem inequitable, where the competitor
has parted with no consideration for the trade secret, that he not be allowed to
profit from such knowledge; however, equitable considerations necessitate actual
notice of the wrong to the competitor before initiating his liability.48
Monetary Relief
In these employer -employee trade secret cases, monetary relief may assume
two forms: actual damages4 9 suffered by the employer from the wrongful disclosure
and use of his trade secrets, or an accounting for unjust profits50 realized by the
competitor or the former employee from the wrongful use of the former employer's
trade secrets. Generally a prayer for monetary relief is in conjunction with, or sub-
ordinate to, a prayer for injunctive relief; however, it would seem that damages
could be sought at law in either tort or contract if the employer would be content
with them. The difficulty of proof of damages is usually considered to account
for the scarcity of cases allowing damages, either at law or in conjunction with an
injunction. In some cases however, damages may be the fairer relief when in-
junctive relief should be denied because of the disclosure of the trade secret to the
45 As by way of independent discovery or analysis of the product sold by the originator.
American Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d 446 (6th Cir. 1942); Gilbert v.
General Motors Corp., 41 F. Supp. 525 (W.D.N.Y. 1941).
46 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §§ 757 (a), 759 (1939).
47 Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff, 299 Ill. 532, 132 N.E. 806 (1921); Pressed Steel Car
Corp. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 At. 4 (1904). RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 757
(c) (1939).
48 Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 542, 73 Ad. 603 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1909); RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 757 (1939); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, § 314 (1958).
49 Spiselman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1946); DeLong Cor-
poration v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
50 Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 542, 73 At. 603 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1909).
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world by either the possessor or the wrongdoer, 51 or because of the nature of the
trade secret itself.52
Injunctive Relief - Present Danger
Once the employer has established the existence of his trade secrets, the em-
ployer must show a present danger of wrongful appropriation before injunctive
relief is obtainable. Typically, no problem exists since the employee has usually
already disclosed the trade secret to the competitor and the competitor is already
using it when the employer brings his action. Proof of this alone is enough to show
present danger of future disclosure and use to warrant the imposition of an injunc-
tion against such future disclosure and use.53 Similarly, when an enforceable cov-
enant not to compete is involved, mere proof that the employee has started working
in competition with the employer is sufficient to secure an injunction. However, absent
an enforceable covenant not to compete, if the employee has not yet disclosed or
used the employer's trade secrets, the present danger factor is imperative to enjoin-
ing such future action. Suits seeking such injunctive relief have been relatively
rare;4 however, recently the remedy has become more popular and several cases55
have considered the remedy. The usual rule followed has been that the mere
employment or prospective employment of the former employee, who has knowledge
of the former employer's trade secrets, by a competitor of such employer without
more is insufficient to justify an injunction against the employee or the competitor."
The court in H. B. Wiggins Sons Co. v. Cott-A-Lapp Co.,5 7 in which no evidence
whatsoever of an intent on the part of the employee to disclose the former em-
ployer's secret chemical process was offered, discussed the above rule as follows:
If the injunction issues, it means that hereafter no man can work for one
and learn his business secrets and after leaving that employment engage him-
self to a rival in business, without carrying on his back into that business the
injunctive mandate of a court of equity. There is nothing whatever in the
facts of this case, except opportunity to do wrong and a suspicion in the
mind of the rival that wrong will be done. The remedy asked for is an
extraordinary one, and should not be lightly indulged in. The chancellor
ought never come into such a frame of mind that he assumes human nature
to be essentially and inherently evil.
This rule was restated in McCombs v. McCleland,58 "If plaintiffs are to
prevail, it must appear that the danger is probable or threatened. (Citation omitted.)
Injunctions will not be granted merely to allay the fears and apprehensions of an
individual. (Citation omitted.)" In this case the court reversed the trial court and
set aside an injunction against a former employee since there was no direct evi-
dence that confidential information had or would be disclosed by the employee.
However, during the past several years, there have been a number of trade
secret cases in which a present threat of disclosure was found to exist, although
there was no actual disclosure. The most noteworthy of these cases is B. F. Goodrich
51 Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485 (1923).
52 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Explanatory Note § 757, comment b at 7 (1939), states that if:[T]he secret consists of mechanical improvements that a good mechanic
can make without resort to the secret, the wrongdoer's liability may be lim-
ited to damages, and an injunction against the future use of the improve-
ments made with the aid of the secret may be inappropriate.
53 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Products, 189 App. Div. 556, 179 N.Y. Supp. 325
(1919) (the problem that it may be impossible to prove that the trade secret has been disclosed
by the former employee).
54 ELLIS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 451.
55 Recent cases granting the remedy: B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99
(Ohio App. 1963); C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374
(1962); Robinson Electronic Supervisory Co. v. Johnson, 397 Pa. 268, 154 A.2d 494 (1959);
Allen Manufacturing Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn. 509, 144 A.2d 306 (1958); and denying the
remedy, McCombs v. McClelland, 223 Or. 475, 354 P.2d 311 (1960).
56 ELLIS, TAi- SECRETS, 127 (1953).
57 169 Fed. 150, 152 (C.C.D. Conn. 1909).
58 223 Or. 475, 354 P.2d 311, 316 (1960).
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Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 9 the "space suit case." The employee, Wohlgemuth, had been
employed by the plaintiff, B. F. Goodrich Co., for eight years; late in 1962, he re-
ceived an offer of employment, at an increased salary, from a competitor of Good-
rich, in the space suit field. During that time, Wohlgemuth held various positions
in Goodrich's pressure space suit department, his last position was that of manager;
his work contributed to maintaining Goodrich's position as the leader in this field.
Wohlgemuth resigned upon receiving an offer of employment as head of the space
suit department of Goodrich's competitor, who, although a newcomer in the field,
had obtained an important government contract. Thereupon Goodrich brought
suit to enjoin his disclosure and use of their trade secrets. The court found suffi-
cient evidence of threatened disclosure of trade secrets from the fact that
Wohlgemuth stated, in effect, that he expected to use all the knowledge that he
had at his command in his new job; this, the court concluded, included some
knowledge of trade secrets which warranted the granting of an injunction against
disclosure. In coming to this conclusion, however, the court relied on evidence
concerning Wohlgemuth's mental attitude in that Wohlgemuth stated, "(L) oyalty
and ethics had their price; insofar as he was concerned International Latex (the
competitor of Goodrich) was paying the price,"'60 when he was told by a member
of the Goodrich staff that he was taking with him a body of information which
did not belong to him.
The other recent cases granting injunctions against the threatened disclosure
of trade secrets have found similar evidence evincing an "evil" intent, on the part
of the employee, to disclose what were considered to be trade secrets. In Allen
Manufacturing Co. v. Loika,11 an injunction against disclosure was granted when
the evidence showed that the employees involved actually sought out a competitor
of the plaintiff and pointed out the advantages plaintiff's secret process made
in the product and stated that they could solve the problems of duplicating
plaintiff's process if they were hired. In contrast the court in the McCombs case,62
denied such an injunction where there was evidence of the employee's good faith
in that she asked her new employer that she not be required to disclose any con-
fidential information about her former employer's business.
Thus it appears that the rule stated in H. B. Wiggins Sons Co., that there
must be something more than the mere occasion to do wrong, is still substantially
followed. However, the McCombs and Allen Manufacturing Co. cases illustrate
that this "something more," for which the courts are looking, is usually some
evidence that the employee has an "evil intention" to act in a manner hostile
to the standards of ethics and morals which the courts are imposing upon the
business community through the law of trade secrets.
Injunctive Relief - Scope
The scope of an injunction for the protection of trade secrets depends on the
facts of each individual case. However, as stated before, a court will usually try
to grant an injunction which will, as nearly as possible, give the necessary pro-
tection to the employer's trade secrets without unduly prejudicing the employee's
employment possibilities or the new employer's opportunities for fair competition.
But in the usual trade secret case, absent a covenant not to compete, the injunction
will not go as far as to prevent the defendant from competing with the employer,
but merely prevents the defendant from disclosing the trade secrets to others and
from using the trade secret in competition with the employer.6 3 This has been the
result, even in a case in which it seems that the employer's trade secrets can be
59 192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
60 Supra note 59, at 104.
61 145 Conn. 509, 144 A.2d 306 (1952).
62 McCombs v. McClelland, 223 Or. 475, 354 P.2d 311 (1960).
63 Irving Iron Works v. Kerlow Steel Flooring Go., 96 N.J. Eq. 702, 126 At. 291 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1924).
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properly protected only by preventing the employee defendant from working in
competition with the employer.64 In respect to duration the usual rule is that the
injunctive relief granted will not be limited by a definite time period.65 However,
when the relief is based on a covenant limited to a definite time period,66 or the
trade secret involved is of such a temporary nature as to require protection for
only a relatively short time,67 the injunction granted may be limited to a definite
period of time.
Conclusion
The trend in this area of the law involving the protection of trade secrets
in the employer-employee relationship would seem to point to more cases to arise
in the future as both the value of trade secrets to employers and the tendency
toward piracy of employees by competitors tend to increase. For this reason each
employer should consider how his trade secrets can be effectively protected. In
all cases the legal protection of trade secrets in the employer-employee relation-
ship follows the general equitable pattern of balancing the interests involved.
When no contract is involved, the interests of the employer are balanced against
those of the defendant within the various ethical guidelines judicially imposed
on the business community. With the evolution of this approach, the morality
of the defendant's actions has become the single most important factor affecting
the possibility of relief. This is especially evidenced by the trend of the law of
trade secrets to become more uncertain as to the particular items which may be
protected as a trade secret in a particular case, and by the necessity of fiuiding
what might be called "evil intention" on the part of the defendant where an in-
junction against threatened disclosure of trade secrets is sought. It would seem
that this factor will continue to be at least as prominent, if not even more so, in
future decisions involving trade secrets; the effect being - even more uncertain
results as to what might be considered a protectable trade secret. It can be ex-
pected, and rightly so, for the courts to give less and less weight to arbitrary dis-
tinctions between the type of secret protected and to extend protection to almost
any secret information used in any way by the business when its disclosure and use
by the employee would be morally objectionable in the opinion of the courts.
When a covenant not to disclose or use is also involved in a particular case,
the result is generally almost identical to that when no such covenant is involved.
For this reason it is the opinion of this writer that such a covenant in itself is
of little or no value for the protection of trade secrets other than as notice to
the employee that the employer believes he has trade secrets which he would like
to protect. This would seem to be a great limitation of the rights of individuals
to freely make contracts; however public policy considerations demand this treat-
64 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Products, 189 App. Div. 556, 179 N.Y. Supp. 325(1919); Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d 201 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1946).
65 Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953).
66 DeLong Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) seems to stand for the
point that an employer may limit his right to have an injunction to a definite time where a
written covenant not to disclose is thus limited in the employment contract. Cf., Securities
Acceptance Corp. v. Brown, 171 Neb. 701, 107 N.W.2d 540 (1961), opined in dictum that
parties to employment contract may contractually limit common law duty on the employee
after leaving employment not to disclose or use trade secrets for his benefit or that of a rival.
67 Where the employer's competitors could be expected to duplicate the employer's work
within the foreseeable future, the injunction not to disclose or use was limited in Fairchild
Engine & Airplane Corp. v. Cox, 50 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944) to five years; and in Allen
Manufacturing Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn. 509, 144 A.2d 306 (1958), to one year. See the discus-
sions in Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion); and in Hyde
Corporation v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763, 771-7 (1958) on the possibility of
granting an injunction of limited duration when a patent has either been applied for or issued
on an alleged trade secret.
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ment at least in the cases where the bargaining positions of the contracting parties
are lopsided.
Covenants not to compete on the other hand can be extremely important for
the protection of trade secrets in the employer-employee relationship. When such
a covenant is enforced, the employee is not faced with the opportunity to disclose
or use the employer's trade secrets. And because of the nature of the trade secret,
this may be the only way to be sure that the trade secret is not being wrongfully
disclosed or used. For this reason a covenant to compete should always be con-
sidered by the employer. However here again public policy considerations demand
close scrutiny of these covenants by the courts. Thus when drafting such a cove-
nant, an employer should be as objective as possible and give considerable recognition
to the rights and needs of the employee; for an enforceable covenant not to com-
pete with some effectiveness is better than an unenforceable covenant.
Andrew 1. Kopko
